We propose a time-of-arrival operator in quantum mechanics by conditioning on a quantum clock. This allows us to bypass the problems that afflict previous proposals, and to obtain a Hermitian time of arrival operator whose probability distribution arises from the Born rule and which has a clear physical interpretation. The same procedure can be employed to measure the "time at which some event happens" for arbitrary events (and not just specifically for the arrival time of a particle).
We propose a time-of-arrival operator in quantum mechanics by conditioning on a quantum clock. This allows us to bypass the problems that afflict previous proposals, and to obtain a Hermitian time of arrival operator whose probability distribution arises from the Born rule and which has a clear physical interpretation. The same procedure can be employed to measure the "time at which some event happens" for arbitrary events (and not just specifically for the arrival time of a particle).
Textbook quantum mechanics cannot describe measurements of time, since time is a parameter and not a quantum observable [1] . This is a clear shortcoming of the theory, since time measurements are routinely carried out in laboratories using quantum systems that act as clocks. Clever and creative tricks were devised to overcome this shortcoming, e.g. see reviews in [2] [3] [4] [5] . However, many of these proposals give conflicting predictions and none of them provides a prescription that applies to generic time measurements: they all focus on specific measurements, e.g. the time of arrival, at a given position, of a particle subject to a specific potential, e.g. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In this paper we provide a general prescription for quantum measurements of the time at which an arbitrary event happens (the time of arrival being a specific instance). It entails quantizing the temporal reference frame, namely employing a quantum system as clock [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Then, textbook quantum mechanics can be applied to describe time measurements through joint quantum observables of the system under analysis and the quantum clock. A simple Bayes conditioning of the Born rule probability of the joint state allows one to recover the full distribution of the time measurement.
It is not always recognized that, in the usual formulation of quantum mechanics, time is a conditioned quantity. The state |ψ(t) is the state of the system conditioned on the time being t in the Schrödinger picture. (Analogously, in the Heisenberg picture the conditioning is on the observables.) This implies that the Born rule refers to conditional probabilities: the probability that the property O = i o i |o i o i | has value o i is p(o i |t) = | ψ(t)|o i | 2 , where o i and |o i are eigenvalues and eigenvectors of O. It is a conditional probability, conditioned on the time being t. Because of this, time appears as a parameter and not as an observable in the usual formulation of quantum mechanics [1] , and textbook quantum mechanics does not directly give a quantum description of time measurements, e.g. the arrival time of a particle at some position [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Most of the previous works considered the time of arrival as a property of the particle, and hence its corresponding observable as an operator acting on the particle's Hilbert space (either a self-adjoint operator [6] [7] [8] or a positive operator valued measure (POVM) [16, 17] ). Here, instead, we consider it as a joint property of the particle and of the clock that is used to measure time. It is an elegant way to tackle the conditioning described above. Indeed, it avoids many of the technicalities of previous proposals for time quantum observables (e.g. the distinctions between the interacting and the non-interacting case [9] ). Here we will consider the time operator as the one obtained from the quantum clock. Different systems track time in different ways and laboratory-grade time measurements will employ the most accurate clocks which are typically macroscopic (classical) systems. So they have an energy spectrum that well approximates a continuous spectrum unbounded from above and below, as is necessary to define a good time operator. Thus the approach used in conventional quantum mechanics of considering time as a conditioned classical parameter is well justified in practice [23] . However, a fully consistent theory must possess a prescription also for time measurements (not just as an approximation in the classical limit), and this is what we propose here.
In this paper we use a quantum reference frame (a quantum clock) to describe time, the Page and Wootters formalism introduced in [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . This allows us to obtain a description of the measurement of the time at which an event happens which bypasses all the problems of previous proposals. Our proposal does not supersede previous ones, which are well suited when considering time as a property of the system itself, and not as a property of a reference system (the clock). While we require a minimal extension of textbook quantum theory, it can be recovered immediately by conditioning the quantum state on what the clock shows [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
For the sake of definiteness, we first focus on the description of the time of arrival of a 1-dimensional particle at a position D (the position of the detector), and then show how the same mechanism can be easily extended to the measurement of the time of occurrence of any event. The particle at time t is described by its state |ψ(t) and the time reference is a continuous quantum degree of freedom described by a Hilbert space H c with deltanormalized basis states |t . We can write the global state of particle plus reference as [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
which is a state in the Hilbert space H c ⊗ H s , with H s the system's Hilbert space, and where the integral is performed on the time interval T (from − T 2 to T 2 ), a regularization parameter. One can think of T as a time interval much larger than all the other time scales: namely the physical description of the system will be accurate for time intervals ≪ T and for energy intervals ≫ 2π /T (see the supplemental material for a review of the Page and Wootters theory and for a justification of T ). The √ T term is introduced in order to have a normalized |Ψ , given that ψ(t)|ψ(t) = 1 for all t. The conventional formulation of quantum mechanics arises from conditioning the reference to time t [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 23] : indeed projecting the reference on the state |t that indicates that time is t, one obtains the "state of the system given that time is t":
and the corresponding wave function ψ(x|t) = x|ψ(t) can be obtained by projecting the system on the position eigenbasis {|x }. The physical meaning of the conditioning (2) is that, once the clock is read out, the system conditioned on the clock outcome is described by the state |ψ(t) , whereas all clock outcomes are equally likely, as expected from a (uniform) quantum clock that does not favor any particular time. We emphasize the conditioned nature of the wavefunction by using the Bayes notation for the conditional probability. Since |Ψ is normalized, it has a probabilistic interpretation that entails a (slight) extension of the Born rule: it uses the "history" state |Ψ that contains the state of the system at all times, instead of using the state of the system |ψ(t) at time t. Indeed one can construct a time of arrival POVM as
where P d = D dx|x x| is the projector of the system at the position D of the detector (D being the spatial interval occupied by it). This projective POVM returns the value t of the clock if the particle is in D or the value na (not arrived) if it is not. One can easily introduce an arrival observable from it, as
where λ is an (arbitrary) eigenvalue that signals that the particle has not arrived (it will be dropped below by considering a vector-valued observable) and 1 1 c is the identity on the clock Hilbert space. The above POVM (or the observable A) does not return the probability distribution of the time of arrival, because it also considers the case in which the particle has not arrived. Indeed, using it in the Born rule, one obtains the joint probability that the particle has arrived and that its time of arrival is t (i.e. the particle is at x ∈ D and the clock shows t):
(The case of a pointlike detector is p = |ψ(D|t)| 2 /T , showing that the wavefunction is a conditioned probability amplitude, and can be connected to a joint probability distribution via the Bayes rule.) Then, the time of arrival distribution is recovered from the joint probability through the Bayes rule as
where the denominator (which is the dwell time [24] .), divided by T , is the unconditioned probability that the particle is found in D at any time, and p(t|x ∈ D) is normalized when integrated on the interval T . The dependence on the regularization parameter T disappears from the probability distribution (6) if the time integral converges for T → ∞, typically if ψ(x|t) → 0 sufficiently fast in this limit. In all other situations, the time distribution p(t|x ∈ D) cannot be normalized over the whole time axis. While this might appear as a flaw of our proposal (as it does not satisfy Kijowski's normalization axiom [7] ), it is actually a feature because it allows our distribution to treat situations where Kijowski's fails, e.g. the case in which the particle is stationary at the detector: in this case p(t|x ∈ D) is a constant and can be normalized only on a finite interval T . One can dismiss this situation as uninteresting in the classical case, but due to the quantum superposition principle, one cannot ignore it in the quantum case, where most reasonable wavepackets have a nonzero probability amplitude of being stationary at the detector position: thus, the experimental predictions of our proposal differ from the others in this case [25] . Consider some other special cases: (i) If the particle never reaches D the probability (6) is meaningless, as expected, since the numerator and denominator are null.
(ii) If the particle crosses D multiple times, the distribution will have multiple peaks, as expected, corresponding to the "crossing times". (iii) If the particle is stationary at the detector position or if it reaches it after some finite time interval but remains there forever, then ψ(x|t) is nonzero for large t and one cannot extend the time integration to infinity. In this case, p(t|x ∈ D) explicitly depends on the interval T , since it is nonzero for arbitrarily large t as expected: the particle will be found at the detector at any sufficiently large time. (iv) A particle performing periodic evolution (e.g. a harmonic oscillator) is a combination of the previous two cases: whatever T interval yields a multi-peak distribution, but again T cannot be increased to encompass all times t for which ψ(x|t) is substantially nonzero. (v) in the simple case of a free nonrelativistic particle with Gaussian initial wavepacket prepared far from the detector and negligible negative momentum components, we obtain [25] the same results of [6, 7] , as expected. (vi) If the particle is split into two wavepackets approaching the detector from opposite directions, our probability distribution will display interference peaks due to the superposition principle, in contrast to other proposals [6, 7] that do not [25] . This difference may be used to perform an experimental test of our proposal. Eq. (6) is our main result.
Discussion. In previous literature, time observables are typically defined on the Hilbert space of the system (e.g. [6, 7, 10, 17, 18] ). The only way the observables of these previous proposals can give rise to a time-of-arrival distribution through the Born rule p(
is by postulating that the observable is a constant of motion, such as Rovelli's evolving constants of motion [26, 27] . This is a consequence of the Born rule's conditioned nature: it contains the state at one time only in the Schrödinger picture (or the observables at one time only in the Heisenberg picture). Namely, a time of arrival operatort = dτ τ |τ τ | with eigenstates |τ in the particle's Hilbert space must return the same outcome τ at any time t through the Born rule:
in the Schrödinger and Heisenberg picture respectively). This requirement leads to awkward statements such as "the time of arrival is τ at time t" and seems physically bizarre, since a constant of motion should give the same outcome whenever it is measured [10] , but this is not the case for typical timeof-arrival experiments, which give an outcome at a well defined time: the measurement cannot be performed before or after the particle has arrived. In contrast, our proposal does not suffer from this problems: our observable is not a constant of motion. It is a joint observable on the system and on the clock. Its time invariance is enforced not dynamically, but by the fact that the state |Ψ of system plus clock is an eigenstate of the global Hamiltonian that defines the total energy constraint [11] . Moreover, the particle does not have to "stop" the clock nor interact with it [20, 28] as there is no clock-system interaction in the global Hamiltonian that defines the constraint: it is the experimentalist that notes the correlations between particle and clock. In other words, the conventional approach of considering the time as a property of the system, described by an operator acting on the system Hilbert space is more appropriate if the system itself is used to measure time: considering the system energy as the generator of time translations implies that that time operator refers to the system's evolution, but this is not what happens typically in a lab, where experiments are timed through an external clock. Indeed, the time operator dt t |t t| in Eq. (4) (where |t is an eigenstate in the clock Hilbert space) is conjugated to the energy of the clock and not of the system [10, 29] ). This is the main advantage of our proposal, which also satisfies the desiderata for a time of arrival operator [6] : it obeys the superposition principle (trivially from linearity) and it originates from the Born rule. As an added bonus, it can also provide a prescription for correlations of successive measurements [25] , a problem that was apparently not even ever considered in previous literature. Finally, a definition of time through a quantum clock can describe real-life situations and experiments, once decoherence is accounted for [15] , as discussed below.
Environment and multiple clocks. Our (idealized) description of Eq. (1) requires the system to be correlated with a single clock and the joint system-clock state to be in a pure state. While this is sufficient to give a fundamental prescription for time measurements in quantum mechanics, we need to show that this is compatible also with real world scenarios where multiple clocks are present and where there is an environment that may interact with the system and clocks. A less idealized description replaces Eq. (1) with
where c 1 , c 2 indicate two different clock systems that are synchronized (they track each other because the joint measurement of both returns the same outcome t), |φ k (t) s indicates the system state at time t, which may be entangled with the orthonormal states |e k (t) e of the environment with amplitude µ k . The time entanglement of (7) is of GHZ-type, which is the one present in the branching states typically used in decoherence models [30] . Eq. (7) is still idealized: good clocks should be sufficiently isolated from the environment (at least for the time interval in which it is considered a good clock) so that their evolution is unperturbed by it. This state contains correlations in time even when one considers only the reduced state ρ c1s of the system and of one of the clocks, say c 1 . In this case, the reduced state is
with ρ s (t) the reduced system state. One can obtain all previous results using the Born rule for ρ c1s . Interestingly, even though this state has lost quantum coherence in the time correlations, retaining only classical correlations, the time of arrival distribution can still display intereference effects [25] . This loss of coherence translates into an effective superselection rule that prevents the creation and detection of superpositions of states of different times [31] . At first sight, the decohered state (8) seems inadequate to describe our perception of time: it describes a random time t, uniformly distributed in [− T 2 , T 2 ] correlated to a state |φ(t) s . However, consider carefully our perception of time. We perceive a single instant (the present) and the past is contained into memory degrees of freedom, internal to some state |φ(t) s : St. Augustine's "the past is present memory". Would we be able to discriminate whether the "present" we perceive is a continuous succession of instants of time (as our naive intuition suggests) or as a random sampling of instants as described by (8) (8) is a good description of our perception of time even if it contains a random time. A more detailed discussion, with a review of previous literature, is in supplemental material.
Time of arbitrary events. Up to now we have considered the time of arrival, which is connected to the event "the particle is at position D". But the whole discussion can be easily extended to the "time at which any event happens". For example, if one considers a spin instead of a particle on a line, one can define the "time at which the spin is up", by substituting P d with the spinup projector |↑ ↑| in Eq. (3) and by replacing Eq. (6) with the conditional probability that time is t given that the spin was up: p(t|↑) = |ψ(↑|t)| 2 / T dt |ψ(↑|t)| 2 with ψ(↑|t) ≡ ↑|ψ(t) the probability amplitude of having spin up at time t. The general case of arbitrary events follows straightforwardly, by using a projector P that represents whatever value of a system property one wants to consider at time t, namely P projects onto the eigenspace relative to some eigenvalue of a system observable. In this case the time distribution is (9) where again the dependence on the regularization parameter T disappears if the integral can be taken on an interval containing all times when the integrand is substantially different from zero and must be retained otherwise. This captures the notion of "event" in quantum mechanics defined as "something that happens to a quantum system", where "something" means "a system observable property taking some value P ".
Expectation values and uncertainty. The presence of λ in the definition (4) of A implies that its expectation value A = Ψ|A|Ψ is not the average time of arrival: the observable must account also for the case in which the particle does not arrive (or the event P does not happen). We can partially amend by considering a 2d vector-valued observable, where the first component of the vector contains the event time occurrence and the second component takes care of the cases in which the event does not occur:
The expectation value of the first component, which we denote byT 1 , is then proportional to the average event occurrence time
The proportionality constant α, arising from the Bayes conditioning (9), is α = 1/ T dt Tr[P |Ψ Ψ|]. Indeed, with this choice, we find the correct t ev = dt t p(t|P ). It is then clear that a null T 1 may not lead to a null t ev if the event never happens, as in this case α = ∞. (We can be sure that there is a nonzero chance that the event happens if the second component's expectation value is T 2 = 1.) The presence of the constant α precludes the use of the Robertson [32] prescription to obtain a time-energy uncertainty relation for the event occurrence time t ev , since its variance is ∆t
Conclusions. In conclusion, we have introduced a prescription for the time measurement of when arbitrary events happen, such as the time of arrival, by considering an observable acting on the extended Hilbert space of system plus time reference. It satisfies the desired properties for a time operator: it is a Hermitian operator (on the extended space), its probability distribution arises from the Born rule, it satisfies the superposition principle and it has the correct physical interpretation arising from a mathematical description of what happens in an actual experiment. Supplemental Material to "Quantum measurements of time"
I. PAGE AND WOOTTERS THEORY AND THE FINITE TIME WINDOW T APPROXIMATION
Here we recall the Page and Wootters mechanism [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 23] and analyze the approximation introduced by considering a finite time window T in Eq. (1), to avoid problems connected to regularizations (see [15, 29] ).
The reader that is familiar with the Page and Wootters mechanism and constrained quantum mechanics can ignore this section. In Sec. II we comment on the fundamental implications of this formalism.
While the introduction of the regularization parameter T may seem restrictive, it is a very good approximation if one considers a sufficiently large time interval T . Moreover, as discussed in the paper, it permits to retain a probabilistic interpretation also to the cases where a normalization over the entire time axis is impossible, e.g. the time of arrival measurement of a particle that is stationary at the detector.
The Page and Wootters mechanism arises by requiring that the state |Ψ of Eq. (1) is an eigenstate of the total energy given by the system Hamiltonian H s plus the clock Hamiltonian (which coincides with its momentum Ω):
where 1 1 c and 1 1 s are the identity operators for the clock and the system respectively. Note that in the total Hamiltonian there is no coupling term between clock and system: a good clock is isolated from the rest [11, 23] . The constraint equation can be taken as evidence of a gauge invariance: since the physical states |Ψ are eigenstates of the global Hamiltonian, they are invariant for shifts of the conjugate quantity, which can be interpreted as the "coordinate time" in general relativity [23, 26] , which is just a gauge because of the diffeomorphism invariance of that theory. The physical time is then attached to some internal degree of freedom, the "clock time", which is conjugate to the clock Hamiltonian Ω. This idea originates from Dirac's analysis of quantum constrained systems, e.g. see [13] . In general relativity it is not possible in general to have a constraint of the form Ω ⊗ 1 1 s + 1 1 c ⊗ H s . When this is possible, then the constraint gives rise to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation [11, 13] (we consider only non-relativistic quantum mechanics in this paper). In fact, in the "position" representation, the momentum satisfies t|Ω = i ∂ ∂t t| and t|Ψ = |ψ(t) , so Eq. (S1) in the position representation for the clock becomes
the time-dependent Schrödinger equation. The constraint also gives rise to the time-independent Schrödinger equation [15] in the "momentum" representation, where ω|Ω = ω ω| and ω|Ψ = |ψ(ω) with |ψ(ω) proportional to the system energy eigenstate of energy − ω or |ψ(ω) = 0 if the system does not possess energy − ω in its energy spectrum, namely Eq. (S1) in the momentum representation for the clock becomes
the time-independent Schrödinger equation, valid only if the Hamiltonian H s has − ω in its spectrum. We emphasize that the energy Ω conjugate to the time observable is the clock energy and not the system energy (whose spectrum may be completely arbitrary) [29] . The above properties hold in the ideal (idealized) case of unbounded continuous time and energy spectrum of the clock. In this paper we considered a clock with a continuous but periodic time spectrum t ∈ [−T /2, T /2], where the eigenvalue t is connected to an eigenvector |t . Then its conjugate momentum (coinciding with the clock energy [11] ) has discrete spectrum n2π/T corresponding to eigenstates:
where we used ∞ n=−∞ e itn2π/T = ∞ m=−∞ δ(t − mT ) with δ the Dirac delta. With these definitions, the state (1) is
The state of the system in terms of the system's energy eigenstates |e m (connected to the eigenvalues ω m ) is
It follows that |ψ n is proportional to a system energy eigenstate |e m only if the clock momentum Ω = 2π T n n|n n| has a spectrum 2π T n sufficiently dense so that there exist an integer n such that ω m = n2π/T which can be attained asymptotically for large T . In this case the integral in (S7) is proportional to a Dirac delta, and the constraint equation (S1) gives rise to the time-independent Schrödinger equation for the system by multiplying both members to the left by the clock energy eigenstate n|:
T n n|Ψ ⇔ H s |ψ n = ω m |ψ n , (S8) with ω m = −2πn/T for some n for each of the system spectrum eigenvalues ω m (and choosing |ψ n = 0 a null vector if −2πn/T is not a system eigenvalue).
We now describe how measurements are treated in constrained quantum mechanics, using the Page and Wootters formalism. In particular we show how the formalism yields the correct statistics of the measurement outcomes that one expects from the Born rule. This treatment explains why one should not necessarily be confined to observables that are constants of motion [6] . The material that follows is a simplified review of [15] .
Suppose that we measure the observable A = a a|a a| at time t a , where a are the eigenvalues and |a the eigenvectors. To obtain the measurement statistics, we track the interaction between the system and the measurement apparatus, using von Neumann's premeasurement prescription [33] and calculate the Born rule using projectors on the degrees of freedom (the memories) that encode the measurement outcomes. An impulsive measurement of A that takes place exactly at time t a is described by the von Neumann pre-measurement unitary evolution [33] 
where |ψ(t a ) and |r m are the initial states of system and memory. The history state that describes this evolution is [15] 
where U is the time evolution operator for the system only (the interaction with the memory is considered explicitly), |ψ(t) the state prior to the measurement, and m is the memory degree of freedom where the measurement outcome is stored. The integrals in (S10) represent the time evolution before the measurement and after the measurement respectively. Note that t a is a value referred to the internal clock even if it seems an external parameter. The Born rule for the projective POVM that projects the memories onto the state |a m gives a probability for the outcomes
where 1 1 is the identity that acts on the Hilbert space of the rest (excluding the memory), and we assume that |r m is orthogonal to all the |a m . Then one immediately recovers the expected Born rule probability
if t > t a or p(a|t) = 0 otherwise. Refer to [15] for more general situations, such as when the system has a nontrivial evolution after the measurement, the case of two time correlations, and POVM measurements. Before closing this section, we briefly comment on how this formalism can describe the preparation of a state at a given time. A state preparation is just a measurement, in which one specific outcome is post-selected [1] . Then a Page-Wootters state that describes the preparation of a system in the state |ψ 0 at time t = 0 is the following
where |i |r m are the states of the system and memory before the preparation, at time t = 0 a measurement that uses the von Neumann prescription (S9) happened, and the m degree of freedom is where the measurement outcome is stored. The measurement is chosen in such a way that the outcome j = 0 corresponds to the state |ψ 0 that needs to be prepared. The experimenter will discard (post-select) all cases when the memory does not contain the outcome j = 0 by running a "discard" transformation U d (a conditional unitary, conditioned on the measurement outcome m) and keep only the state |ψ 0 corresponding to j = 0. For example, this is the way that a spin-1/2 "up" state can be prepared: the experimenter sends the spin through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus and discards (using some physical transformation U d such as a beam-stop) all spins that end in the lower arm, postselecting on the spins that end up in the higher arm. These are thus prepared in the spin up state.
II. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
In this section we detail the foundational motivations that lead us to employ the constraint formalism of Page and Wootters, and give an interpretation of the results and of the quantum states we introduced in the previous sections. Some of the considerations discussed here have appeared in the literature many times previously, e.g. [11, 12, 14, 15, 26] and elsewhere.
In textbook quantum mechanics, time is treated as a (classical) parameter. This parameter is typically interpreted as the time shown by a (classical) clock that is external to the system. This clock is used to determine the time of the events described by the Schrödinger equation and of the measurements described by the Born rule. So, textbook quantum mechanics requires an external classical world both to describe the measurement apparatus and the clocks that establish the timings. This is perfectly consistent as long as one does not want to give a quantum description of time measurements, so we certainly do not advocate that textbook quantum mechanics should be abandoned.
The fact that time is determined externally to quantum mechanics is reflected in the fact that states and Born-rule probabilities in textbook quantum mechanics are conditioned quantities, as discussed in the main text: |ψ(t) is the state of the system given that the time is t, and p(a|t) = | a|ψ(t) | 2 is the probability that the outcome of the observable A = a a|a a| gives result a given that the time is t. Now, we want to go beyond textbook quantum mechanics and provide a quantum description of time measurements. Clearly this cannot be done as long as the conditioning happens on a classical clock system. A clever idea [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] is to use a quantum system as a clock. Then, one can retain most of textbook quantum mechanics with minimal changes: (i) one cannot use the Schrödinger equation where the time variable is a classical parameter, but that equation can be replaced by the constraint equation (S1) which is equivalent to the Schrödinger one when written in the position representation, as shown above. (ii) the Born rule should be applied not to the time-conditioned state |ψ(t) , but to the PageWootters history state |Ψ that, as an eigenstate of the constraint equation, contains the full dynamics (i.e. the solutions of the Schrödinger equation at all times).
The rest of quantum mechanics can be retained without changes, since textbook quantum mechanics can be obtained by conditioning the system state and the system measurement outcomes on the clock measurement outcomes, as shown in the previous section and in [15] .
One may object that there is no "flow" of time in a state such as (S10), since time is an internal degree of freedom, and it describes a sort of "frozen time formalism" [26] . This objection can be bypassed on many levels.
(i) At a philosophical level, it has been proposed multiple times and by many that time does not flow. Events flow in time (a river flows with respect to time), but it is meaningless to assume that time itself flows. If one were to claim that time flows in itself, that would lead to apparently meaningless claims such as "time flows at a 'speed' of one second per second". Some philosophers (e.g. Barbour, McTaggart) push this argument to its ultimate consequence, and claim that time does not exist. Leibnitz apparently even changed the spelling of his last name to Leibniz to protest against the existence of time as an absolute entity that flows irrespective of any event.
(Newton famously took the opposite view.) We will not enter into the philosophical debate here, but just point out that our formalism embodies the relational view of Leibniz: time in itself does not flow, but it can be seen as a relation between different events. This is evident for example in the state (S10), where the temporal degree of freedom is internal and its change can only be ascertained by correlation measurements between that degree of freedom and other internal degrees of freedom. A measurement of the time degree by itself would only return a random outcome without intrinsic meaning.
(ii) At a physical level, the possibility of having a quantum formalism that considers time as an internal degree of freedom is very appealing for different reasons. For example, approaches based on constraint equations a la Dirac have been very fruitful in quantum cosmology [23] and in canonical approaches to the quantization of gravity [26, 34] . In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the constraint equation can be more simply interpreted as a global conservation law (the conservation of total energy, in our case) which, through Noether's theorem, is connected to a global time translational invariance: only the internal time is meaningful, whereas the "external" time (the variable conjugate to the constraint) is unphysical.
(iii) At a conceptual level, we need to show that our formalism is consistent with our experiences and perceptions. If one measures the time degree of freedom in a Page-Wootters state such as (S10), one obtains a random outcome t uniformly distributed between −∞ and +∞ (or in the interval [−T /2, T /2] in the regularized version). This seems to blatantly contradict our perception of time measurements, where we perceive time as a continuous stream of connected perceptions. However, a more careful reflection shows that this perception is not at all in contradiction with the Page-Wootters state. What we really perceive is a single instant of time (the present) and we are aware of the past only through our memories: Sidney Coleman's "the past is present memory". Whether or not different time measurements that lead to our perception of time happen in a continuous succession (as our naive perception of time suggests) is a completely untestable statement: there is no way it can be falsified experimentally. Hence it is not a scientific statement. This is just the fallacy of the "flow" of time itself in another guise.
Thus we can confidently claim that the Page-Wootters formalism is foundationally appealing: it encodes Leibniz's relationalism; it has been fruitfully employed in quantum mechanics of constrained systems and requires the minimal changes to textbook quantum mechanics required by a quantization of the temporal degree of freedom; it is compatible with our own perception of time.
